The Electoral Count Reform Act (ECRA), which President Biden signed into law on Dec. 29, 2022, is nothing short of a miracle in the annals of democracy reform. It would merit that recognition at any time. But that it found a path through the highly polarized politics and pressures of the times makes the achievement all the more remarkable. Already we have seen retrospectives that rightly note key factors contributing to its success, such as strong congressional leadership and the constructive use of bipartisan expertise on complex technical and constitutional questions. There is much credit to go around.

The ECRA experience also presents a possible model for thinking about what might be feasible in the next phase of federal-level democracy reform. Of course, the divided 118th Congress will make for much tougher sledding for all such endeavors. In the best of times, reform is caught up in party and other politics. This is even more true in a presidential election cycle in this sharply divided polity. But what worked in the Electoral Count Act case may help shape the reform agenda for the near future.

First, nobody seriously disputed the merits of Electoral Count Act reform. The 1887 statute was a shambles in desperate need of fixing. Its weaknesses were papered over by widespread observance of norms governing the congressional vote count for over a century. Then the times caught up with it. The calamitous Jan. 6-7, 2021, session left no doubt that failure to amend the statute before the next presidential election posed unacceptable risks. 

Second, and this strength is not to be underestimated, the case on the merits was entirely compatible with common sense intuitions. By and large, there was agreement that Congress should not be able, on the whim of a partisan majority, to simply chuck out votes for president that they wish had been cast differently, and that the states should not be able to change the outcome of an election by changing the law after Election Day. There were a few voices here and there to suggest that perhaps the vice president did have the unilateral authority to reject election results or suspend the proceedings. But this was always a distinctly minority view on both sides of the aisle.

Third, nobody could argue that reform of the Electoral Count Act would have the effect of advantaging one party over the other. Each party understands perfectly well that control of Congress will shift, as will the identity of the vice president. And the same is true of control of state legislatures that might be preparing “alternative slates of electors” to substitute for the ones approved by the voters. So the ECRA was blessedly free of the perceived danger of political engineering that would somehow sculpt the competitive landscape favorably for one party or the other into the future.

Fourth, the ECRA was not part of an ambitious package of electoral reforms (like the sprawling and ill-fated Protecting Our Democracy Act) that linked the success of any one type of relatively uncontroversial reform to the fate of many other somewhat more controversial reforms. To be sure, the ECRA was in the same Senate bill as presidential transition reform, but the latter discrete reform was related to the ECRA and relatively uncontroversial. When the fate of one reform is tied to a much more ambitious, controversial, and disconnected set of other reforms, reaching consensus obviously becomes much harder. 

Fifth, the issues that needed to be worked through for passage of the ECRA lent themselves to the constructive support and participation of a bipartisan community of legal experts. The aim of reform was to work with baseline agreements, such as the need to raise the thresholds for objections or clarify the role of the vice president, and then tackle more controversial questions, such as the role for the courts in resolving disputes over the actions of state legislatures and officials.

This could be done—and was done—without igniting the fatal objection that Congress was somehow radically altering institutional roles within the federalist structure. In testimony before Congress, and on call to support the outstanding congressional staff in the drafting process, legal experts of different backgrounds, party affiliations, and ideological orientations could help work through these details. In the end, for example, the federal courts were afforded a significant role, but within existing authorities, in hearing cases brought by presidential and vice presidential candidates. A meaningful reform that would not draw fire as “radical” in design stood the best chance of maintaining bipartisan support.

Many of these criteria, by the way, were the key to other governance reforms late last year—on presidential transitions, inspectors general, and presidential transparency about international agreements. In our view, these criteria for reform suggest the potential for agreement in the next Congress on reform in at least three areas: emergency powers, vacancies reform, and war powers.

Emergency Powers

The need for emergency powers reform has been explained in detail elsewhere, including by us. In a nutshell, the problem is that Congress has authorized a wide array of presidential emergency powers that presidents of both parties have invoked aggressively in situations that are not real emergencies—and that presidents can renew indefinitely under the National Emergencies Act, subject only to veto-overriding supermajorities in Congress. (Congress originally sought to control emergency powers in the National Emergencies Act with legislative vetoes, but the Supreme Court’s invalidation of such vetoes shifted emergency power enormously to the president.)

The good news is that emergency powers reform has bipartisan support in both houses of Congress. There is even bipartisan agreement on the shape such reform should take. National emergency powers reform with bipartisan support came close to passage last year. The consensus position, in brief, is that new presidential assertions of emergency powers should terminate after 30 or so legislative days unless Congress approves the emergency using expedited procedures. The emergency could then last one year, subject to renewals by the president that are approved by Congress using the same expedited procedures. The consensus proposals exempted the president’s most vital emergency power—the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

This sensible reform is teed up to succeed. No one seriously doubts that the president’s array of emergency powers, as they have come to be practiced, are too excessive and undisciplined. Common sense dictates that emergency powers should be limited to real emergencies and not confer timeless power. The reform is neutral in the sense that it would impact the practices of presidents of both parties. And, as noted, there is a sensible consensus on what reform should look like.

Vacancies Reform

We described the problems with the current law of presidential vacancies in detail in “After Trump.” In brief, the 1998 Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA) has allowed presidents of both parties to exercise broad discretion to skirt the Senate confirmation process by filling vacant senior executive branch slots with “acting” officials who can serve for 200 days and sometimes longer. Any sensible reform here must have two elements. First, it must curb the president’s authority to fill vacant senior executive branch positions in a way that skirts the Senate’s check and other public accountability mechanisms. We proposed a scheme to do so in “After Trump,” but there are many options here. 

Second, and just as important, Congress must give the executive branch something in return. The flip side of presidential abuse of vacancies is that a recalcitrant Senate controlled by a party that opposes the president can block effective governance through its refusal to confirm nominees. As we explained in “After Trump,” there are good reasons to think that Congress requires confirmation of way too many executive branch officials, and that the Senate could use this power over confirmations to hamstring the executive if the latter’s power over vacancies is narrowed. There needs to be some compromise on this question. In “After Trump” we proposed reducing the number of Senate-confirmed appointments, but there may be other solutions.

This reform in theory can satisfy the ECRA model for success. The current legal regime on vacancies is obviously suboptimal. Common sense dictates that the president must be able to fill a vacant position when the Senate refuses to confirm a candidate, but that the president’s discretion should be channeled more compared to the current FVRA baseline. And a reform like this should be able to attract bipartisan support in Congress since it responds to past excesses by presidents of both parties and will apply going forward with equal force to presidents of both parties.

War Powers

There are three basic elements of war powers reform: abrogating the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force related to Iraq, updating the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, and amending the War Powers Resolution. The first reform is easiest to achieve and has come close to happening several times in the past few years. It meets all of the criteria that made Electoral Count Act reform possible. The second reform is harder. But there is a consensus across the parties and the political branches that some reform here is needed. Success here will depend on leadership in Congress and the White House. War Powers Resolution reform will be much harder because there are stark differences within Congress and between Congress and the White House.

***

The passage of the ECRA suggests there are achievable goals of democracy reform even as polarization retains its grip, we now have a divided government, and a presidential election is less than two years away. The way forward will not, of course, be easy, and a broad agenda like the one for which we argued in “After Trump” will have to be trimmed as these circumstances require. But the narrowing of these objectives in the near term does not mean that they are somehow less consequential. And the success of any one reform invites consideration of the next steps. It keeps the entire reform enterprise going.

Negotiations for a U.N. cybercrime convention have entered a critical stage. From Jan. 9 to Jan. 20, hundreds of delegates from over 150 states met in Vienna for more than 100 hours of exhausting negotiations during the fourth round of discussions of the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee mandated by the U.N. General Assembly. The negotiations were marked by attempts by authoritarian states to transform this potentially important instrument into a tool for political control. They were also marked by efforts to water down certain human rights and due process safeguards introduced in the draft convention.

Setting the Scene  

Cybercrime knows no borders, and enhanced international cooperation is key to combating it. Last year, the U.N. embarked on the very ambitious journey to adopt (over only a period of two years) a global cybercrime treaty. This project was met with skepticism from some states, nongovernmental organizations, and other stakeholders that doubted the necessity of such a treaty. Their main concerns were twofold. First, they argued that the creation of a U.N cybercrime treaty risks fragmentation in the fight against cybercrime due to the existence of other key instruments—and especially the 2001 Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention on Cybercrime—which could ultimately stifle global anti-cybercrime efforts. And, second, they warned of the potential risk that authoritarian countries could try to transform a U.N. cybercrime convention into an information control treaty, with provisions dangerous for internet freedoms and human rights.

Following three sessions in 2022, delegations from U.N. member states arrived in Vienna on Jan. 9 to discuss the first three chapters of the proposed cybercrime convention—General Provisions, Criminalization, and Procedural Measures and Law Enforcement—composed by 55 articles outlined in the Consolidated Negotiation Document.

Since the beginning, these negotiations have been marked by disagreements and controversies about the objectives and the scope of the convention. U.N. member states negotiate a global cybercrime convention, but they disagree strongly about what “cybercrime” means. States are also diverging about the very title of the convention. Some states seek a U.N. convention against cybercrime. Russia—the country that initiated this process at the U.N.—insists that the convention be named a “Comprehensive International Convention on Countering the Use of Information and Communications Technologies for Criminal Purposes,” which is a notably broad title with open-ended terminology, full of risks. 

Russia’s Waning Influence?

Russia was initially extremely influential in encouraging the U.N. General Assembly to mandate the negotiation of a cybercrime convention by adopting Resolution 74/247. The country even went so far as to present its own version of a draft treaty. But Russia’s influence in the negotiations began to decline amid the country’s invasion of Ukraine. 

The first session of the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee began on Feb. 28, 2022, just four days after Russia invaded Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, the war featured in the debate. Western states and others expressed support for Ukraine and strongly condemned Russia’s aggression as a major violation of the U.N. Charter. These states also highlighted the difficulty of negotiating a cybercrime convention with a state that is violating the fundamental rules of international law and is also launching cyberattacks as part of its aggression. 

However, the Russian vision of a U.N. cybercrime convention has not lost all support. Russia’s draft convention was actually presented as a joint draft with China. Additionally, Resolution 74/247 was sponsored by more than 40 states, including several African states and India. If Russia was the leader of this project, its initiative gained the support of other states that still share the Russian perspective on this issue.

One of Russia’s intentions in pushing for a U.N. cybercrime convention was likely an attempt to undermine the Budapest Cybercrime Convention. This convention is the major international instrument in the fight against cybercrime. It was adopted in 2001 by the Council of Europe. Russia, which was until recently a member of the Council of Europe, refused to ratify it. Still the Budapest Convention has been adopted by 68 states, including 23 that are not in the Council of Europe (including the United States). Despite Russia’s efforts, the U.N. negotiations seem to have had a rejuvenating effect on the Budapest Convention. Since 2019, when the U.N. decided to embark on Russia’s project, five more African and South American states, including Nigeria and Brazil, have joined the Budapest Convention, and more are expected to do so soon. These countries also spare no effort in stressing the need for the future U.N. cybercrime convention to be aligned with the Budapest Convention. Indeed, as Alexander Seger, head of cybercrime at the Council of Europe observed, it is likely that, when the dust settles in the negotiations, the vast majority of U.N. states will support a convention on cybercrime that is very similar to the Budapest Convention. 

Separating the Bad Seeds From the Good in Vienna

One of the most critical issues discussed in Vienna was the list of criminal offenses that should be included in the convention. There were no less than 28 “crimes” in the initial Consolidated Negotiation Document, and two other offenses were proposed in Vienna. However, numerous states objected to the majority of these proposals.

All states agreed that the U.N. convention should include “cyber-dependent” crimes, which are crimes that would not exist at all without information and communications technology (ICT) systems. An example of such a crime would be illegal access to a computer system.

However, Russia, China, and other states also wish to include in the U.N. convention, in addition to cyber-dependent crimes, a long series of “cyber-enabled” crimes. These are crimes that can be committed without ICT but can also be enabled by ICT. As an example, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, illegal distribution of counterfeit medicines, or money laundering can be committed without ICT, but a computer can be used in order to facilitate them. 

It is this second category that created a lot of controversy in Vienna. While all states agree that certain well-established cyber-enabled crimes, especially those related to child sexual abuse material, should be included as criminal offenses in the convention, most of the proposed cyber-enabled crimes raised concerns, either because they are already covered by other instruments or because of their significant negative impact on human rights.

For instance, Western states and others strongly opposed the efforts of Russia, China, and others to introduce into the U.N. convention certain highly controversial “content-related” crimes, such as “incitement to subversive activities,” “extremism-related offenses,” and “terrorism-related offenses.” There are no internationally agreed definitions of these terms, which could easily be abused by authoritarian regimes in order, for instance, to prosecute political opponents. All of these proposals were excluded from the plenary after only a few days of negotiation and were relegated to informal discussion in “facilitator groups” in Vienna. 

For the good of free speech and human rights, these proposals will hopefully never make their way into the convention. Still, democratic states must be wary of these proposals creeping back into main discussions about the convention. Even though these proposals are now only discussed informally, some states asked not only to reinstate these content crimes in the convention but also to “strengthen” and “expand” them. In addition, several proposals were put forward to include a provision on the possibility of adding protocols to the U.N. convention after it has been finalized, which means that proposals that concern ill-defined content-related offenses—which could lead to political control and repressive policies against political opponents, journalists, and human rights activists—could make a comeback even after the adoption of the main convention. 

China Proposes Criminalizing “Dissemination of False Information”

The skillful maneuvers of Chinese diplomats demonstrate the necessity for states to be vigilant in defending internet freedoms and human rights against repeated attacks. 

In 2022, at the beginning of the negotiations, China suggested that the U.N. convention criminalize the use of the internet to “disseminate harmful information.” However, China waited until the end of the first phase of the negotiations in January 2023 in Vienna in order to propose a specific draft article on “dissemination of false information.” This means that this article appeared in the draft at a time when stakeholders were thinking that the controversial content-related crimes had been relegated to the informal facilitator meetings. Fortunately, the U.N. chair organized a second round of discussions six days later on the newly proposed articles, which afforded a dozen states and the EU on behalf of its 27 members the opportunity to oppose the article proposed by China.

By introducing such a “crime” in the draft, China was likely seeking to test how other states would react. Indeed, dissemination of false information, fake news, and disinformation is a problem for all states. But it is a complex problem that requires careful consideration—including important human rights safeguards—before regulation can be accomplished. Such a “fake news” offense could be misused and abused to harm human rights. For instance, governments could require platforms to take down content criticizing governmental policies, arguing that this is “disinformation.”

This issue is extremely sensitive. For example, in June 2022 the EU—with its strong human rights protections—opted to adopt “a code of practice” on disinformation, rather than a binding regulation, in order to mitigate the risks. The EU’s fear was that binding rules for online falsehoods risk platforms removing too much content, which could lead to some “kind of censorship,” as warned by Věra Jourová, the commission’s vice president on values and transparency. 

Like China, Russia used similar tactics to test the waters. For instance, as the negotiations in Vienna were drawing to a close, Russia proposed a new article calling on states to “adopt legislative measures” that obligate service providers within their territories to retain all traffic and content data. Russia is undoubtedly aware of the arm wrestling between several EU member countries and the Court of Justice of the European Union on this issue. The country likely proposed this article to observe how other countries intend to deal with it. 

Calls to Remove “Protection of Privacy and Personal Data” From Due Process Safeguards 

Another risk for human rights came from some countries’ proposals to remove a very important article from the convention. Article 42 (1) of the Consolidated Negotiation Document provides for “conditions and safeguards” for the exercise of the powers recognized in favor of law enforcement authorities in their fight against cybercrime. 

More specifically, Article 42 (1) found in Chapter III dedicated to “Procedural Measures and Law Enforcement” powers of states, provides that:

Each State Party shall ensure that the establishment, implementation and application of the powers and procedures provided for in this chapter are subject to conditions and safeguards provided for under its domestic law, which shall provide for the adequate protection of human rights and liberties, including rights and fundamental freedoms arising from its obligations under applicable international human rights law, and which shall incorporate the principles of proportionality, necessity and legality and the protection of privacy and personal data.

Malaysia, Singapore, Pakistan, Russia, and others—according to the list compiled by the U.N. secretariat—proposed that this article be removed. These countries claimed that the article is redundant due to the presence of Article 5 in the draft, which provides that “States Parties shall ensure that the implementation of their obligations under this Convention is in accordance with applicable international human rights law.” Some countries—such as Russia and Iran—went further and suggested that Article 5 be removed from the draft as well. Contrary to the efforts of these states, it is imperative that Article 42 remain in the draft because it protects specific due process safeguards. Article 5 is a clause of a general nature on respect of human rights, which is also essential, but not at all redundant with the introduction of necessary specific safeguards in other parts of the convention. 

Other countries were of the opinion that Article 42 should be maintained in the Consolidated Negotiation Document but suggested that references to the “principles of proportionality, necessity and legality” and the “protection of privacy and personal data” be removed from the document. Countries in favor of this option argued that the protection of privacy is covered by the general reference to human rights; that protection of personal data is not a right recognized as such at the U.N. level; that the principles of proportionality, necessity, and legality are sometimes not found as such or do not have the same meaning in different domestic systems; and that these principles did not exist in U.N. human rights or criminal conventions.

With regard to “personal data,” it is surprising that these countries suggest that such a concept does not exist at the global level. As we describe in a recent Cross-Border Data Forum submission to the U.N., this term is included and/or defined in a very similar way in several international instruments from Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Europe. What’s more, the U.N. Convention Against Corruption—which is used as a model for the current negotiations—refers to “the protection of privacy & personal data.” And the Second Additional Protocol to the Budapest Cybercrime Convention refers to “personal data” 38 times—it even has an article on “Protection of Personal Data,” which stresses how important it is to protect personal data in the context of criminal investigations.

As far as the right to privacy is concerned, it is recognized by fundamental international instruments—both at the regional level (for instance, in the European or the Inter-American Conventions of Human Rights) and at the global level with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 

Similarly, the ICCPR—which is ratified by 173 countries—includes the fundamental principles of legality (“provided by law”) and necessity (“necessary in a democratic society”), while the U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC) constantly refers to the principle of proportionality (see, for instance, the recent HRC general comment on Article 21 of the ICCPR, which refers to proportionality 18 times).

Rather than removing or weakening Article’s 42 safeguards, it could be useful for the U.N. member states to seek inspiration from the recent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Declaration on Government Access to Personal Data held by Private Sector Entities, which refers to “personal data” 23 times, starts with the principle of legality (“legal basis”), and includes a second, very important principle, according to which: 

Government access is carried out in accordance with legal standards of necessity, proportionality, reasonableness and other standards that protect against the risk of misuse and abuse, as set out in and interpreted within the country’s legal framework.

While the context is somewhat different (the OECD declaration focuses on government access to data held by the private sector for national security and law enforcement purposes, while the U.N. convention focuses on the fight against cybercrime), U.N. member states should affirm that they “reject any approach to government access to personal data held by private sector entities that, regardless of the context, is inconsistent with democratic values and the rule of law, and is unconstrained, unreasonable, arbitrary or disproportionate,” as outlined in the OECD declaration.

The Way Forward

The Ad Hoc Committee will meet this April in Vienna to discuss the second half—60 articles—of the convention. They will address fundamental issues including international cooperation, technical assistance, and information/data exchange. Then states will meet in New York in August, for a third reading of the draft convention, in the hopes of finalizing the text so that it can be approved formally in February 2024 during a concluding session in New York.

To meet this extremely demanding timetable, the chair, assisted by the U.N. secretariat, will have some important decisions to make. A U.N. cybercrime convention could, together with the Budapest Convention, become an important tool for international cooperation in the fight against cybercrime. But this kind of cooperation requires that the “crimes” included be commonly understood and recognized by all parties involved. It also requires the introduction of robust human rights safeguards in order to limit the risks of its misuse or abuse, and to create trust among states.

It seems like everyone has classified documents stashed away these days. First, it was Donald Trump, with the Justice Department investigation into documents stored improperly at Mar-a-Lago. Then, it was Joe Biden, with news that documents bearing classification markings were found at Biden’s Wilmington home and at the Penn Biden Center. And now, former Vice President Mike Pence has also uncovered classified materials at his home. What on earth is going on?

Lawfare senior editor Quinta Jurecic sat down with Lawfare editor-in-chief Benjamin Wittes, publisher David Priess, and senior editor Scott Anderson to discuss. They talked about why classified documents are suddenly showing up everywhere; how to understand the differences between the Trump, Biden, and Pence cases; and what to make of the pickle that Attorney General Merrick Garland now finds himself in. 

NACO, Ariz. (NewsNation) — As fentanyl continues to flood streets across America, the fight continues to combat and stop it along the U.S-Mexico border from drug traffickers smuggling the lethal drug daily.

Fentanyl continues to pour into Arizona; 833,400 fentanyl pills were discovered within two days by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers at the Nogales Port of Entry. The Tucson area of operation leads the nation in fentanyl seizures, with more than 18.8 million seized since October.

Fentanyl is 50 times stronger than heroin and 100 times stronger than morphine. Two milligrams of the lethal drug, which is the size of a mosquito, is enough to kill an adult. The CDC said more than 100,000 people died of drug overdoses in 2021, and more than 65,000 of those deaths were linked to fentanyl.

In many cases, the drug is ingested without the person’s knowledge. Fentanyl is easily mixed with drugs like cocaine and heroin, and illegal versions of the drug are often made to look like candy.

The flow of the deadly narcotic is very reminiscent of the cocaine epidemic in the 1980s. Fentanyl began as a more affordable alternative to heroin, but a much deadlier high. Like cocaine, the more popular the drug became, the more production increased.

“Opioid overdose deaths are nothing compared to cocaine overdose death. The morbidity and mortality, the risk of dying from using opioids is enormously greater than that of cocaine,” said Dr. James Besante, with Carle Health. “What is similar to the crack cocaine epidemic of the 1980s is stigma. Especially stigma lobbied against certain communities. We have seen the overdose epidemic in the United States of America has not affected all people equally.”

While cocaine originated mostly in Colombia and landed primarily in Miami to start, fentanyl is getting assistance from multiple countries. Chemicals are coming from China and the pills are manufactured in makeshift labs in Mexico before entering the U.S., according to the Drug Enforcement Administration.

Trafficking organizations controlled cocaine operations in the ’80s just as cartels are controlling fentanyl operations now.

CBP is doing all it can to stop combat this issue, thwarting roughly $3 billion in drug smuggling efforts from September 2021 through August 2022. Agents seized 13,581 pounds of fentanyl at the border. Domestically, federal, state, local and Tribal law enforcement agencies seized at least 23,248 pounds of fentanyl.

The drug is increasingly becoming a growing threat to teenagers.

Besante encourages parents to have open lines of communication with their children, as using drugs during childhood is a big risk for developing substance abuse later in life.

A report by Families Against Fentanyl, a nonprofit spreading awareness about the deadly opioid, found that children under 14 are dying of fentanyl poisoning at a rate faster than any other age group.

Between 2019 and 2021, synthetic opioid fatalities led by fentanyl poisonings among U.S. children under 14 years old increased faster than among any other U.S. age group, according to an FAF analysis of Centers for Disease Control and Prevention data.

Threat actors are targeting Israeli chemical companies operating in the occupied territories, security experts warn.

Threat actors have launched a massive hacking campaign aimed at Israeli chemical companies operating in the occupied territories. A group, named Electronic Quds Force, is threatening companies’ engineers and workers and are inviting them to resign from their positions.

The attacks are retaliation against the Israeli government and its policy against Palestinians, the hackers accuse Tel Aviv of violence.

“Our advice to scientists working in the chemical plants is to quit their job, hunt for a new one, and find sanctuary in a location where we are not present,” the message sent by the Electronic Quds Force. “Leave their employment. Look for a new one.” “This is while we have a strong presence anyplace,”

“We confirm that your job in chemical factories presents a threat to your life; but, we will never hesitate to melt your bodies with chemicals the next time an act of violence is performed against Palestinians.”

The message is clear and hackers claim to be able to interfere with the operations at the plant operated by the chemical companies potentially causing the loss of human lives.

The tension is very high during this period, the Palestinian Ministry of Health said that January is “the bloodiest month in the West Bank since 2015, during which, to date, 35 martyrs were killed by the Israeli occupation army and settlers, including 8 children, in addition to an elderly woman.”

“Jenin Governorate recorded the highest number Of the martyrs since the beginning of this year, 20 martyrs.” he added.

The messages were published on the Telegram channel of the group along with images of Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) allegedly belonging to one of the chemical companies that are targets of the cyber attacks.

The number of operations conducted by the Israeli military in the Palestinian villages is reportedly increased in the last week, according to the United Nations, 2022 was the deadliest year for Palestinians living in the West Bank in the previous 16 years’ worth of data.

The cyber attacks on both sides are increasing, in September 2022, Pro-Palestinian Hacking Group GhostSec claimed to have compromised 55 Berghof programmable logic controllers (PLCs) used by Israeli organizations as part of a Free Palestine campaign.

GhostSec also published a video demonstrating a successful log-in to the PLC’s admin panel along with screenshots of an HMI screen showing some phases of the attack, including the block of the PLC.

The group also shared other screenshots, claiming to have gained access to another control panel that can be used to modify the level of chlorine and pH levels in the water.

In August 2022, the hacking group ALtahrea Team knocked down the websites of the ports of Jaffa, Haifa, Acre, and Eilat.

The group also targeted hundreds of Israeli websites, including the website of the municipality of the city of Sderot.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Israeli chemical companies)

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