Claims made by Russian President Vladimir Putin that the United States is intentionally prolonging the Russia-Ukraine conflict may not be as implausible as described, says one U.S. military veteran and journalist.

In a speech this week, Putin called out “Western globalist elites” who he said are “provoking chaos, inciting old and new conflicts,” and attempting “to preserve the hegemony and power that is slipping out of their hands.” He added that the situation in Ukraine shows the U.S. is “trying to prolong the conflict.”

Sean Spoonts, a U.S. Navy veteran and editor-in-chief of Special Operations Forces Report (SOFREP), told Newsweek that President Joe Biden and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky seem to have separate policy goals in mind.

“It seems like while Ukraine would like to end the war quickly and decisively defeat Russian forces and drive them out of their country, U.S. policy almost seems designed to prolong the conflict hoping to bring about the collapse of Russia itself, both militarily and economically,” Spoonts said.

Biden denied the United States is working to dismantle Russia, writing in a New York Times op-ed in May that “we do not want to prolong the war just to inflict pain on Russia.”

The U.S. and Germany have provided Ukrainian forces with HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems), which require missiles that some military experts believe could become limited by year’s end. However, the United States has resisted Ukraine’s calls to send long-range missiles and fighter jets, which Ukraine has cited as being able to potentially help turn the tide of the war.

While the U.S. aid has significantly helped Ukraine, Spoonts said the White House “is so concerned with making this a multinational effort that it’s adding lots of complications to arming Ukraine.” Spoonts also criticized the White House for knowing Russia’s plans to invade and not taking the initiative to preemptively impose sanctions and deter the attack.

Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks during the opening ceremony of the Army-2022 International Military-Technical Forum on August 15 in Kubinka, outside of Moscow. A U.S. military expert said comments made by Putin about the U.S. prolonging the Ukraine-Russia conflict may not be far-fetched.
Getty Images

As a recent report by The Washington Post indicated, the U.S. was privy to some of Russia’s plans for the invasion of Ukraine before it officially began on February 24. Spoonts alluded to Biden’s remarks on that day, when he said, “Some of the most powerful impacts of our actions will come over time as we squeeze Russia’s access to finance and technology for strategic sectors of its economy and degrade its industrial capacity for years to come.”

“Biden has said publicly that his goal is to degrade Russia as a world power, never again in the position to threaten its neighbors,” said Spoonts. “That goes a lot further than Zelensky’s goal, which is to simply get Russian armies out of his country and regain lost territories in Donbas, Luhansk and Crimea.”

Ukrainian forces have deterred many Russian attacks over the past six months and impacted Russian troops in meaningful ways, resulting in what U.S. officials have cited as at least 75,000 Russian troops either killed or injured since the war’s start.

Meanwhile, Russian land and sea artillery have taken massive losses. As Putin has touted his country’s so-called advanced weaponry, outsiders have stated that the “sophisticated systems and weapons that Ukraine has access to” are currently dwarfing the impact of Russia’s own weapons.

“We’re seeing more and more examples of leaked or overheard conversations among (Russian) soldiers, making it clear that they’re getting tired of not having sophisticated weapons,” former U.S. Ambassador Mark Green told Newsweek.

While the United States and other NATO countries have tried to balance aiding Ukraine without provoking Russia to declare a multinational war, Spoonts said it may be the wrong strategy.

“We seem to be doing enough to keep Ukraine fighting but not providing enough to Ukraine to go over to the offensive and drive Russia out entirely. We think that is a bad idea. There are limits to the fighting spirit of any army, including Ukraine’s,” Spoonts said.

Названы две причины сокращения западной военной помощи ВСУ

Зеленский: переговоры с Россией возобновятся после вывода ее войск с территории Украины

Владимир Зеленский. Фото: Sergii Kharchenko / ZumaPress / Globallookpress.com

This November Donald Trump faces an existential test. He has spent the primary season throwing around his political weight by endorsing candidates all over the United States. The midterm elections will serve as a true test of his power, and the outcomes will determine his future strength in the party.

Donald Trump’s record of success in primary endorsements has been mixed, as my colleagues have written extensively about in previous posts. He has padded that record, in part, by offering last minute endorsements—or in the case of the Missouri Senate race with a vague endorsement. Some of Mr. Trump’s endorsements went to candidates who were incumbents or were widely expected to win. In other races such as for governors of Pennsylvania and Maryland and for Senate in Connecticut, Ohio and Arizona, those endorsements were important to the outcome.

Trump’s endorsement strategy is bold—to an extent never before in modern politics he has put his reputation on the line in the midterm elections. But winning primaries is only half the battle. While any politician or former elected official likes to tout a win-loss record (when it is flattering) of their endorsements, the former president faces a second and bigger battle in the general election. In some cases, his endorsements were seen as supporting less electable candidates [i.e., Doug Mastriano (PA-GOV); J.D. Vance (OH-SEN); Herschel Walker (GA-SEN); Mehmet Oz (PA-SEN); Josh Gibbs (MI-03); etc.)

With the sitting Democratic president entering the midterm cycle with low approval ratings, the environment is ripe for Republicans to dominate at all levels of government. Mr. Trump’s endorsement of candidates in deep red states or districts will surely pad his win-loss record. However, if Senate candidates like Walker, Oz, Vance, or Blake Masters (AZ) ultimately lose in numbers that maintains Democrats’ Senate majority, Mr. Trump will be widely blamed. Many expect Democrats to lose their majority in the House. However, if they manage to keep it or if several Trump-backed candidates lose, narrowing Republicans’ potential majority, Mr. Trump will take another hit.

Finally, in governor races, where Republicans could have been or should be competitive in places like Pennsylvania, Arizona, Maryland, Wisconsin, and Michigan, Trump’s endorsements could backfire if Democrats net a pickup in those races. The potential for Republicans to sweep Democrats across the board exists, but it may not ultimately happen, and that possibility is starting to worry Republican strategists. If Democrats hold off historic losses, and especially if they are able to maintain or even expand control in the U.S. Senate, the GOP blame game will begin.

Of course, surprising Democratic strength this November would not be entirely Mr. Trump’s fault. A wildly unpopular Supreme Court decision around abortion (although resultant from Mr. Trump’s Supreme Court nominations), a string of legislative victories, slowing inflation, and sustained job creation all work to bolster Democratic chances. But it’s a midterm and Republicans are supposed to win. If Republicans don’t win, questions about and skepticism of Mr. Trump’s political power and influence will be centerstage in GOP discussions.

Yes, Mr. Trump made himself vulnerable by making endorsements of riskier candidates, bucking the GOP establishment. However, many Republicans endorsed different, controversial candidates in certain races. If election night in November proves underwhelming for Republicans, Mr. Trump’s GOP rivals will pounce. Potential 2024 candidates like Ron DeSantis, Mike Pence, Liz Cheney, Nikki Haley, Larry Hogan, Greg Abbott, and Mike Pompeo are looking for any opportunity to paint the former president as weak, politically ineffective, and as yesterday’s news. The midterms will present the opportunity to label him exactly that. Swarms of GOP voters will continue to genuflect before Donald Trump; others may grow their skepticism about whether he is truly the future of the party.

Thus far, Mr. Trump has already had some luck in head-to-head endorsement fights with his former vice president, Mike Pence. Trump-endorsed candidates bested Pence-endorsed candidates in the Arizona and Wisconsin gubernatorial primaries. (Although, it should be noted in the Georgia governor’s race, Pence-backed Brian Kemp beat out the Trump-backed candidate). However, those “wins” for Mr. Trump reflects precisely his vulnerability in the general election. If Pence-backed candidates are seen as more electable (they likely were) and Trump-backed candidates lose the general, it will be marketed as other party elders being better equipped to pick general election winners than the former president.

Of course, another path exists. That path involves Donald Trump’s endorsements being wildly successful. The dream scenario for the former president is one in which Democratic Senate incumbents in Arizona, Georgia, and Nevada lose to Trump-endorsed Republicans, and Trump-endorsees hold Senate seats in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Pair that with a large GOP House majority and flipping governors’ seats in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, and Donald Trump will look to the Republican Party like a political genius and a powerful kingmaker. If Trump-backed candidates push the GOP over the finish line in terms of control of the Senate and an expansion of Republican control of statewide offices, it will be hard for other Republicans to challenge the former president in his path to the nomination in 2024.

Donald Trump is not on any ballot in 2022, but his political future is. Mr. Trump could have sat quietly in the political shadows during the midterm campaigns, rebuilding his political operation and strategizing a path to return to the White House. Instead, he opted to stay engaged and continue his work of reshaping the Republican Party in his image. The risks and rewards are both significant—an unsurprising wager a man who cut his teeth in big-city real estate would be willing to take. But, ultimately, the midterms will likely either make Donald Trump an also-ran or the commanding force in party politics for years to come.

If we believed the malpractice mainstream media two years ago, we should have seen four men go to prison for the plan to kidnap Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer.

These four men were part of the Wolverine Watchmen, a militia-style group who were not happy with Whitmer’s heavy-handed restrictions during the COVID scare.

But when a jury heard the case earlier this year, it became apparent that an FBI informant was trying to convince the men to carry out the attack, and two of the men were found not guilty while a mistrial was declared on two others.

Clearly, this was not the open-and-shut case the media had told us it was, and clearly the FBI informant was not playing by the rules in trying to convince these men to break the law.

Combine that with FBI agent Peter Strzock who sent a text to FBI lawyer Lisa Page that they would “stop” Trump from becoming president, and if he somehow he became president there as an “insurance policy” that would cripple Trump’s presidency.

While the FBI plays a crucial role in law enforcement, actions like these also show another side of the agency, one that is less noble and more targeted, and in almost every case their target is a conservative.

After the raid on Mar-a-Lago, a resort owned by Trump and Trump’s Florida home, conducted by 30 armed FBI agents, it comes as no surprise that the population is questioning the actions. It’s not against these particular agents. They were simply doing what they were ordered to do.

The outrage is targeted at those who give the orders and whether those orders are politically motivated or legitimate legal actions.

When former FBI agents make derogatory statements about one political party, and agents are planted in groups to try to encourage illegal behavior, it brings into question the entire organization.

Today, a court will be hearing whether or not the affidavit that led to the raid on Trump’s home will be released, and while the Department of Justice is fighting to prevent its release, that same resistance might be what is scaring many Americans.

Without explanation agents can get a sympathetic judge to allow the pillaging of any home in the nation, looking for God knows what. 

In the United States, investigations follow criminal actions in an effort to find the person responsible, they do not find an individual they don’t like and try to find a crime.

The FBI and the DOJ have more to lose than Trump does by sealing the affidavit, even if it shows weak grounds for performing the raid. 

While the DOJ contends the affidavit release would harm their ongoing investigation, how could that be since the raid already took place and the DOJ is in possession of 20 boxes of material. Whatever the affidavit contends, the evidence they wanted is supposed to be in those boxes, which has already been viewed by DOJ officials months ago.

Letting Trump know what they are attempting to find at this point does less harm than the American people believing the government agencies have been abused for political purposes. The benefit of the doubt no longer exists after a history of abuses.

Another point to consider here is the belief that Trump would have kept something incriminating at his residence. If he is the evil mastermind the left believes him to be, what incriminating documents were they expecting to find lying around in the one place the DOJ has already shown an interest? Even if the left believes Trump isn’t that smart, he is surrounded by the best and brightest.

Ralph Waldo Emerson famously said, “When you strike at a king, you must kill him.” That also applies to striking at your political enemies.

Attorney General Merrick Garland has taken ownership of this raid, and so he has taken the shot at the king. Once the affidavit is released, it had better be able to topple Trump, not only in the eyes of the left, but his crime has to be so egregious that the American people turn on the man who is currently leading most polls as becoming president in 2024.

Just seeking the return of federal documents won’t fly. To have asked the FBI to carry out this raid had better net much more than that to justify such use of force.

Simply put, either Trump goes to prison in disgrace, or Garland resigns. If Trump does not go to prison, and Garland remains, then the FBI will be no different than the Soviet KGB, and only a new president can fix it.

In February 1993, former CIA director James Woolsey famously described the post-cold war environment by stating that the US and its allies slayed a large dragon (the Soviet Union) but ended up in a jungle full of snakes (warlords in failed states, terrorism and various substate threats). 

David Kilcullen argued in a masterpiece that “dragons” (international and regional powers) can fight like “snakes” (substate actors) to enhance military effectiveness. 

In Ukraine, Russian forces have employed both methods of warfare. It has employed tactics similar to those used by the so-called “Islamic State Organisation” (IS). 

These tactics are ideology-free and combat effective. Many of them are prohibited and their results can amount to war crimes. 

How Islamic State fights

IS and its predecessor, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), started their “special military operation” to occupy parts of Syria and Libya in 2011 and 2014, respectively. The organisation initially relied on covert operations to infiltrate both rebel and regime security and military structures, absorbing like-minded organisations and individuals, creating false-front civilian organisations, collecting intelligence (and “dirt”) on community leaders in targeted areas, all while initially denying its existence on the targeted territories. 

Similarities can be found in methods of warfare employed by the Russian armed forces under Vladimir Putin and the combat units of IS

These operations were led by “agents-in-charge”: spymasters with kinetic assets and authority to assassinate, bomb, bribe, recruit, map-out targeted territories and designate local factions and communities. The most famous of these “agents-in-charge” was Samir al-Khlifawi, better known as Haji Bakr.

The modus operandi paid off. By September 2013, IS became the dominant armed organisation in Raqqa city by relying almost exclusively on urban terrorism tactics and infiltration operations. These actions were followed by raiding and looting parts of both the Assad regime’s and armed opposition’s conventional arsenals, which IS then modified, converted, and upgraded. 

Similar modi operandi were executed in the Libyan city of Sirte in 2015 and selectively in a range of towns and cities from the southern Philippines to western Libya, and more recently in West Africa.  

How Russia fights in Ukraine

“Good people, bad authority does not work [in Ukraine]. Recognition of this fact is the basis of the policy of denazification… The name ‘Ukraine’ apparently cannot be preserved as the title of any fully de-nazified state…Denazification will inevitably be de-Ukrainianisation.” 

These excerpts from an infamous article published in the Russian state-controlled news agency RIA Novosti represent a type of propaganda which legitimates mass violence against non-conformist peoples and the liquidation of existing states. It is similar to types of propaganda employed in other modern historical contexts, including by IS. 

The parallels between the tactics of Russia and IS do not end with propaganda, however. Other similarities can be found in methods of warfare employed by the Russian armed forces under Vladimir Putin and the combat units of IS. 

Children handle real unloaded guns and real unloaded rifles during a promotional campaign for contract service in the Russian Army, on 20 December 2014 in Sevastopol, Crimea (AFP)

As of February 2014 in Crimea and April 2014 in the Donbas, Russia and its local proxies relied on tactics that are very similar to those employed by IS and its predecessors between 2012 and 2014. 

For instance, both Russia and IS have used false-front civilian organisations, kidnapping and assassinations, propaganda and disinformation campaigns, psychological warfare, and infiltrations of senior ranks. Initially, Russia didn’t admit to having employed these tactics (maskirovka), but neither did IS initially.

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To secure its strategic gains, Russia executed one of the largest air-assault operations in the history of Eastern Europe in Crimea, a military capacity that IS never had.

Despite the gap in capacities, the combination of intense hybrid warfare followed by securing gains with a conventional force is a very IS-like modus operandi, executed several times in multiple cities, including Iraq’s Mosul in June 2014. 

When Russia occupied the most important geostrategic region of Ukraine with minimum resistance by the end of March 2014, similar modi operandi were executed in several cities in Eastern Ukraine, including the Donbas region, in April 2014. These operations were led by some of the same GRU commanders who led the invasion of Crimea, the most infamous of whom is Colonel Igor Gurkin. 

The outcomes of these operations in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and elsewhere ranged between partial and total failures. “Kharkiv People’s Republic” did not last 24 hours between 7 and 8 April 2014. Ukrainian Russian-speakers in Ukraine’s largest Russian-speaking city rapidly brought down Putin’s proxy republic.

Rape and IEDs

Now, we fast-forward to 2022, and the similarities between IS and Putin’s ways of warfare are even more pronounced. The demonstration of extreme brutality on social media, alleged executions of prisoners of war, identity-based executions in Bucha and Irpin, rape and other forms of sexual violence are all war crimes. They were used as tools of psychological warfare by IS to either dominate or destroy a community, most notably the Yazidis in northern Iraq. 

Rape, as a crime of war, was weaponised by elements of the Russian armed forces multiple times before, especially during the first and second Chechen wars. The case of rapist-officer Colonel Yuri Budanov of the 160^th Tank Guards Regiment is perhaps the most infamous. Amnesty International, Memorial, and other human rights organisations documented other alleged cases. 

Ukraine’s state emergency services claim that demining specialists have cleared more than 70,000 explosive devices

The interception of a discussion about raping Ukrainian women between a Russian soldier and his wife is quite an alarming development. The intensity of propaganda on official Russian TV and other media outlets likely contributes, either directly or indirectly, to this behaviour. 

Reliance on improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and IED-based weapon systems, especially during manoeuvres and retrogrades, was a hallmark of IS’s innovative way of warfare. 

Between January 2014 and December 2015, Russia and Russian-led separatist forces (RLFs) used IEDs well-over 600 times, including 24 attacks with vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) and another 24 attacks using remote-controlled ones (RCIEDs). 

In 2022, the intensity, scale, scope, and locations of IEDs and ordnances left behind by the Russian combat units in urban areas, including children’s parks and schoolyards, are both shocking and inexplicable in military terms. 

“We thought Iraq was bad, but Ukraine is gargantuan,” said Major Chris Hunter, Britain’s most experienced terrorist-bomb disposal expert.

So far, officials in Ukraine’s state emergency services claim that demining specialists have cleared more than 70,000 explosive devices, including thousands of IEDs and boobytraps. More than 18,000 of these items were destroyed in the Kyiv Oblast (province) alone.

Using religion 

IS is also well-known for abusing and weaponising religious texts to mobilise, recruit, and justify aggression and mass violence. The organisation is versed in creating narratives based on false and/or selective versions of historical events, mixing them with out-of-context religious texts and then widely disseminating them using multimedia effects. As a result, IS was able to mobilise thousands of dedicated foreign fighters and transnational support networks. 

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Religious legitimation of the aggression against Ukraine was not absent in the Russian propaganda as well. 

Patriarch Kirill of Moscow has not only legitimated the “special operation” but also gifted General Viktor Zolotov – Rosgvardiya’s (national guard) commander in chief – an icon to bless the soldiers and the war.

Among the soldiers of Rosgvardiya are the followers of Ramazan Kadyrov (the Kadyrovtsy), the son of Chechnya’s highest religious authority, former mufti, and rebel-turned-president, Akhmad Kadyrov.

Ramazan posted on his Telegram account a video of the Kadyrovtsy-Rosgvardiya’s soldiers shouting “Allahu Akbar” in the ruins of Mariupol, where they had combat roles. 

Operational victories, strategic defeat?

Like IS, the Russian armed forces suffer from a structural crisis: limited manpower to achieve their strategic goals. IS was outnumbered and outgunned during the overwhelming majority of its battles, whether against state or non-state forces. 

Given its initial strategic objectives, Russia has suffered from a similar crisis. It cannot control 604,000 square kilometres with 130 battalion tactical groups, high rates of attrition, strong levels of local resistance and unprecedented Nato and international support to Ukraine. 

IS had multiple tactical and (almost miraculous) operational victories between 2013 and 2015, and so did Russia in 2014 and 2022. IS could not secure any of these victories, however, due in part to limited manpower, local resistance, external support to its enemies and the overall illegitimate and criminal behaviour. 

Putin’s army is facing similar structural, military, moral and legal challenges. It is likely to face the same fate in Ukraine that IS faced in Iraq, Syria and Libya: spectacular operational victories, but ultimately strategic defeat.

This article is available in French on Middle East Eye French edition. 

Nearly six months into Russia’s bloody war against Ukraine, it appears Vladimir Putin has pinned his hopes for claiming victory on a self-described “organized crime syndicate” that is now trawling prisons for cold-blooded killers and deploying mercenaries to straighten out fed-up troops.

That’s according to several explosive new reports out Thursday by the independent Russian investigative news outlets iStories and The Insider, both of which uncovered disturbing new details about the notorious Wagner Group’s alleged role in the war.

After myriad reports in recent weeks that Kremlin-linked businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin has been personally touring Russian prisons and promising inmates full amnesty if they fight for Wagner in Ukraine, a staffer at a high-security penal colony in the Tula region has revealed the real reason behind the desperate recruiting drive.

Identified only as Ivan, the staffer told The Insider that Prighozhin had visited personally on July 24 and told inmates the regular Russian military was “weakening” and “cannot cope” with the war.

Prighozin said he’d been given an order by President Putin “to use all possible resources” to win the war, Ivan was quoted saying.

“He called his organization an organized crime group and talked a lot about the advantage of participating in war through them. Honestly, I thought it was a surrealistic dream. A man who had a Hero of Russia star pinned to his T-shirt, was telling us loud and clear about what was going on in our country. That gangsters are really in power and they don’t give a fuck about any human rights organizations like Gulagu.net or the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers,” he said.

“I’m not afraid to say, we’re an organized crime group that helps the Russian army,” another inmate, Alexei, quoted Prighozin as saying.

Sergei, an inmate at a penal colony in Bryansk, was quoted telling the outlet he’d desperately tried to join Wagner but was ultimately rejected and had come to realize that was a good thing.

The recruiters, he’d said, had announced they were looking for inmates convicted of murder, to be sure that they’d be prepared to kill again.

“Out of 400 people they took 150. I passed all of the tests, I passed the commission, but at the last stage FSB officers came, and they rejected me because of my tattoos, I had a swastika tattoo. I think they were accepting those who had nothing to lose, but I was unlucky,” he was quoted saying.

He went on to say that, after talking to more people outside of prison about the war, he’d learned no one was getting paid the compensation they were promised and that it was all really just a “meat grinder.”

“On TV they show one thing, but in reality everything is probably different,” he said.

Human rights groups and inmates alike have both also expressed concerns that the Wagner recruiting drive that has so far been voluntary may soon become forced. A friend of an inmate in Plavsk interviewed by Mediazona earlier this month said Wagner representatives had told prisoners they’d be back for another visit in two or three months if they “run out” of inmates from the first wave of recruitment.

So far, according to the independent outlet Verstka, which has also closely covered the alleged Wagner recruiting drive, the mercenary group has recruited more than 1,000 inmates at 17 different penal colonies throughout Russia.

Long accused by Western officials and investigative journalists of financing Wagner, Prigozhin has denied having any links to the paramilitary force, a shadowy group that has left a long trail of war crimes allegations in its wake in Ukraine, Syria and the Central African Republic.

Wagner has also been deployed to crack down on regular Russian troops trying to ditch the war, according to soldiers interviewed by iStories.

Family members of Russian soldiers and some soldiers themselves say Wagner mercenaries have been guarding makeshift camps in the occupied Luhansk region where troops who try to leave the war are being held against their will in basements.

Dmitry, the father of a soldier who wound up at such a camp in Bryanka, told iStories his son became alarmed after arriving and noticing the set up.

“In Bryanka, they were first told that [military] posts had been set up because they were guarding against all sorts of [Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups]. And then they saw that all the posts were deployed inside the camp. Roughly speaking, the firing zone was inward,” he said.

Dmitry said his son was repeatedly beaten for refusing to go back to the front—and was at one point dragged off to face execution.

“They said, ‘Lie down on the ground so your brains don’t splatter everywhere, and count to ten,’” he recalled. After he refused to do so, they bashed him over the head, he said.

Sergei, a Russian soldier who said he also wound up at the camp after telling the military command he wanted out of the war, told iStories he’d seen captives snatched up and taken in an “unknown direction” by men he identified as Wagner fighters, one of whom wound up dead on his way to the front line, supposedly from shelling.

He said troops at the camp, including himself, first went through questioning by commanders and “psychologists” who tried to convince them to join Wagner, but if that didn’t work, they’d be handed over to Wagner mercenaries.

“They really beat guys there with truncheons in basements… They say: ‘We will kill you, nothing will happen to us for it. Nobody knows you’re here,’” he said.

Sergei, who eventually made it back to Russia and has filed a complaint with military prosecutors, along with several other troops, said he’d come to realize the camps had all been set up with one goal in mind: forcing troops into Wagner.

Of the second camp he said he was held at in Luhansk, he said: “We found out that this place was called a ‘center for psychological support for military personnel,’ but in reality it was just recruitment for Wagner.”

He and other soldiers who escaped say they are now disgusted by the Russian leadership they once swore allegiance to—and that disillusionment set in almost immediately after many of them arrived in Ukraine and realized what was really happening there.

“Do you understand that we’re really the fascists?” Sergei recalled telling a fellow soldier. “He said, ‘I was scared to say the same thing to you, I thought you’d shoot me. Yes, we’re the fascists, and I realize that.”

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