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NATO allies fear Putin’s Belarus military build-up will be permanent

Alyaksandr Lukashenka won’t say when the estimated 30,000 Russian troops currently in Belarus will leave.

Amid the largest Russian military deployment to Belarus since the Cold War, which includes Iskander tactical missiles, S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems, and SU-35 fighter jets, the autocratic Belarusian ruler said he would meet with Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin this week to decide “when, on what terms, and on what schedule” the troops will leave. “It will be our decision. This is our territory,” he added.

The Russian deployment to Belarus is ostensibly for military exercises that are scheduled to run until February 20. But they are being deployed menacingly close the Belarusian-Ukrainian border at a time when Russia continues to concentrate more than 100,000 troops near its own border with Ukraine and in the annexed Crimean peninsula. Meanwhile, the Russian Navy is conducting live fire exercises in the Black Sea near Ukraine’s coast.

In an interview with Foreign Policy, Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau said the nature of the deployment to Belarus suggests the Russian troops may never leave. “The military build-up in Belarus seems to be something more permanent, unfortunately, and it’s a great concern of ours,” he said.

The most immediate concern about Moscow’s troop deployment to Belarus is, of course, the prospect of them being used as part of a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. In addition to increasing the Russian military encirclement of Ukraine, the presence of these troops also means an invasion force striking from Belarus could reach Kyiv in roughly two hours.

But the long-term ramifications of Putin’s militarization of Belarus are equally disturbing and represent the most significant change in the security calculus in Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War. This would be the case even if Putin had not chosen to instigate and manufacture a crisis with Ukraine.

“Belarusian territory is simply a staging area for the Russian army, and the extent of the threat from Belarus is determined by one factor alone: how keen the Kremlin is to go to war,” Belarusian political analyst Artyom Shraibman wrote in a commentary for the Moscow Carnegie Center.

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Unsurprisingly, the countries on NATO’s eastern flank that border Russia and Belarus are now raising the alarm.

The Baltic states in particular are concerned that a permanent Russian troop presence in Belarus would enhance Moscow’s ability to seal the Suwalki Gap, a 60-mile stretch of flat land along the Polish-Lithuanian border between Belarus and the western Russian exclave of Kaliningrad.

If Russia were able to seize and seal this strategic piece of European land, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would find themselves cut off from the rest of NATO. The three Baltic nations would be unable to receive reinforcements by land and would be vulnerable to aggression from Moscow.

In remarks to the Washington Post, permanent secretary of the Estonian Ministry of Defense Kusti Salm put it bluntly: “Now we are a peninsula. We would become an island.”

Likewise, speaking to Foreign Policy, Kristjan Mae, the head of the NATO and European Union Department in Estonia’s Defense Ministry called the Russian build-up in Belarus “a game-changer,” adding that in the past “Belarus had always resisted having Russian troops permanently stationed” in the country. “What we are seeing at this very moment are strategic capabilities, on top of conventional troops, that will change the calculation in favor of Russia even further,” Mae said.

Lithuania and Poland, both of which border Belarus to the West, are calling on the United States and NATO to deploy more troops and military hardware to the alliance’s vulnerable eastern members.

After meeting with UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Simonyte said her country needs “an increased NATO partner presence in Lithuania.” Likewise, Polish Foreign Minister Rau reportedly told US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken that deterrence needs to be increased. “More Atlantic alliance troops are needed in the face of a potential threat growing on the other side of our border,” Rau stated.

Roughly 12,000 NATO and US troops are currently stationed in the Baltics, Poland, and Romania on a rotational basis. On January 24, US President Joe Biden placed 8,500 US troops on “high alert” to deploy to Eastern Europe if necessary. And on February 2, the Pentagon deployed 2,000 troops to Europe, mostly to Poland, and moved an additional 1,000 troops from Germany to Romania.

These moves are all welcome. But given how dramatically Russia’s militarization of Belarus is changing the security equation for NATO’s front line states, recent steps are probably insufficient. The United States and NATO should consider giving the Baltics and Poland what they have been requesting for years: permanent US and NATO bases.

At the moment all eyes are understandably on Russian saber-rattling along Ukrainian border. But regardless of how Putin’s manufactured crisis in Ukraine ends, the threat to NATO’s eastern flank will remain.

Brian Whitmore is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, an Assistant Professor of Practice at the University of Texas at Arlington, and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.

Further reading

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post NATO allies fear Putin’s Belarus military build-up will be permanent appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Pavel in Defense One on US force posture

On February 17, senior vice president and director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Barry Pavel authored an article in Defense One titled “Biden should shift US troop positions worldwide.” In the article, Pavel recommends that the Biden administration forthcoming National Defense Strategy (NDS) reflects the need to balance the Chinese and Russian threats simultaneously.

For the duration of the Europe crisis, the U.S.-led alliance network in Europe and the Indo-Pacific will have to work much more closely together to allocate their forces to both theaters in smart ways.

Barry Pavel

Forward Defense

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes the debate around the greatest military challenges facing the United States and its allies, and creates forward-looking assessments of the trends, technologies, and concepts that will define the future of warfare.

The post Pavel in Defense One on US force posture appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Putin’s absurd genocide claims cannot hide his war crimes in Ukraine

As the world watches to see whether Vladimir Putin will launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian President has once again accused the Ukrainian authorities of committing “genocide” in the east of the country. There have been no serious efforts to support this explosive claim, leading to fears that it is merely designed to provide justification for a looming military offensive.

Putin’s genocide allegations are not only groundless. They represent a grotesque distortion of reality that seeks to blame the victims for a war of aggression orchestrated by Moscow that has killed thousands of Ukrainians and forced millions to flee their homes.

Unfortunately for Putin, history will record his crimes in Ukraine. Long after he has gone and his genocide propaganda has been forgotten, the Russian leader will be remembered as a man who waged war on “brotherly” Ukrainians and shattered bonds dating back centuries.

Ever since the outbreak of hostilities in eastern Ukraine in early 2014, it has been known that the war was sparked and led by Kremlin agents. Some of these Russian nationals have gone on to enjoy a degree of fame in Russia itself, even representing Putin’s own political party in the Russian parliament.

Detailed accounts of Kremlin atrocities in eastern Ukraine also exist. They make for grim reading and highlight the scale of the war crimes that have taken place amid the lawlessness of Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine. As the person who gave the order to launch the entire operation, Putin is ultimately responsible for every death.

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The first killings in eastern Ukraine occurred on April 13, 2014, when Russians led by Muscovite Igor Girkin ambushed and killed a group of Ukrainian officers near to the town of Slovyansk. In an intercepted phone conversation, Gikrin could be heard gloating about the murders with Russian accomplices.

Days later, 42-year-old Ukrainian politician Volodymyr Rybak was abducted and murdered for the crime of defying the Kremlin takeover of Horlivka and attempting to fly the Ukrainian flag from the town hall. His badly mutilated body was later found in a river. During an interview five years later, Girkin admitted to also participating in this murder.

In June 2014, the growing religious intolerance of the Kremlin occupation forces led to the murder of four evangelical Christians. Viktor Bradarsky, Volodymyr Velychko, Ruvim Pavenko, and Albert Pavenko were leaving church when they were seized and killed by members of the so-called “Russian Orthodox Army.” Their bodies were discovered in a mass grave one month later following the Ukrainian liberation of Slovyansk.

Stepan Chubenko was a promising 16-year-old footballer from Kramatorsk with a Russian mother and a Ukrainian father. On July 23, 2014, he was taken off a train by Kremlin forces and murdered for being “pro-Ukrainian.” When the teenager’s body was later recovered, it showed signs of torture. Since the liberation of his hometown, a monument to Stepan has been erected in his memory.

Olena Kulish and Volodymyr Aliokhin were a married couple from Luhansk whose crime was helping to feed Ukrainian soldiers. In August 2014, they were abducted from their family home by Kremlin forces and executed.

The list goes on. There are literally thousands of equally distressing accounts from the past eight years of Russian aggression against Ukraine.

In addition to the large numbers of Ukrainian troops who have died defending their country, many more Ukrainians have been killed in Russian atrocities such as the January 2015 shelling of a residential district in front line city Mariupol, which left at least 29 civilians dead. The single deadliest attack of the entire war remains the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 by a Russian military anti-aircraft missile system in July 2014, killing all 298 passengers and crew.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin has transformed occupied eastern Ukraine into a human rights black hole. Since the onset of the conflict in spring 2014, the occupation authorities have maintained a network of secretive detention centers and basement torture chambers that have drawn chilling comparisons with the worst excesses of the totalitarian twentieth century.

Ukrainians are well aware of the horrors that have accompanied Russian occupation in the east of the country. This awareness is one of many factors currently fueling Ukraine’s will to resist. They understand what awaits them if Putin’s forces are able to seize more Ukrainian land and unleash their terror tactics on new civilian populations. Indeed, the United States reports that the Kremlin has already compiled lists of Ukrainians to be detained and possibly killed in the event of a full-scale Russian invasion.

Putin’s accusations of genocide are clearly absurd but they are no laughing matter. On the contrary, he appears to be paving the way for a new wave of military aggression as he desperately seeks to prevent the loss of Ukraine.

With the world confronted by the prospect of the largest European conflict since World War II, it is imperative that the international community now send an unambiguous message to Moscow. Western leaders must inform Putin that not only do they reject his baseless claims of genocide, but they also hold him personally responsible for the crimes being committed in his name and under his tacit command.

Olexander Scherba is a former Ukrainian diplomat who served as Ukrainian Ambassador to Austria (2014-2021).

Further reading

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Follow us on social media
and support our work

The post Putin’s absurd genocide claims cannot hide his war crimes in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Transatlantic Telegram: Whatever happens next in Ukraine, a new European security order is emerging

We are trying something new at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. With our fellows constantly traveling back and forth around the continent, we thought we would get in the habit of exchanging letters in public, tackling the pressing issue of the day. With Ukraine on the boil, the future of the European security order is at the forefront of everyone’s mind.

Last week, senior fellow Ben Judah was in Lithuania, a frontline NATO state that has become the capital-in-exile of the Russian and Belarusian opposition. He sent a dispatch explaining the subtle shifts that have been destabilizing Europe’s periphery even before Russian troops started massing on Ukraine’s borders. In response, senior fellow Damir Marusic describes the sense in Washington that this crisis is both familiar and taking us into uncharted waters.

Vilnius: Russian power looms over everything

Dear Damir, 

Instead of rushing to Kyiv, where every camera crew and freelancer is now waiting for something remarkable to happen, I spent last week in Vilnius trying to get a sense of how this crisis is being felt just across the border. Three things jumped out at me. 

First, there is a pervasive feeling that a new iron curtain is descending on the continent. Interviewing Belarusian dissidents and escapees, I was struck by how divided Europe feels again. This is principally, but not exclusively, about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggression and Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s repression. It’s also due to COVID-19 restrictions (which have closed borders), Western sanctions (which have dented trade), and the physical hardening of the European Union’s frontiers. As recently as three years ago, there was more of a feeling of globalization and openness—even if Belarus and Russia remained authoritarian. Today, listening to people recount their experiences running from border guards in the dead of night, or to businessmen noting how Russian and Belarusian elites have disappeared from projects, it feels like there are two different Europes again. 

Second, in my meetings with officials from the Lithuanian parliament’s foreign affairs committee, I was struck by how, for them, Belarus simply doesn’t exist anymore as an independent state. That feeling of two different Europes is also a political reality. Lithuanian officials believe that masked by COVID, the ground has been shifting under our feet. Lukashenka’s violent crackdown on the opposition has all but rendered him a vassal to Moscow. All eyes in Vilnius are on the Belarusian constitutional referendum scheduled for later this year, which would remove the country’s neutrality and non-nuclear status. This would make legal what Lithuanian officials claim they can already see happening over the border: New permanent Russian bases are springing up all across the country. Most striking is how Russian power now looms over everything. One Lithuanian official told me that to resolve a growing list of bilateral cross-border issues, it was increasingly clear Moscow needed to be consulted. Lithuania is reluctant to do so, and as a result, its isolation from its neighbor deepens. 

These two observations left me wondering about Putin’s intentions: If he has decided that a new iron curtain either suits him or has been imposed on him, is the Ukraine crisis a moment of confrontation to determine where it will lie for decades? Once one is in that frame of mind, the temptation to push the dividing line as far forward as possible becomes easier to understand. 

Finally, it’s hard to miss that despite all these fast-breaking changes, security dynamics are slow to adapt. In all my conversations, war, and what comes next, was never far away. Britain is broadly popular and praised for its security engagement. France is viewed as trying to play a constructive role. But when it comes to true fundamentals, what London or Paris or Brussels are up to, in terms of providing security, simply does not amount to much from the Baltic perspective. The only thing that really matters, according to officials from the defense committee of the Lithuanian parliament, is the presence of American troops. That, ultimately, is what NATO, and membership in the West, means to them. Only the United States guarantees their independence. 

It made me reflect on how remote and abstract ideas such as “European strategic autonomy”— let alone “Global Britain”—appeared here. Lithuanians want more (and permanent) American bases to garrison these self-described front-line states in the quickly changing landscape of Eastern Europe. But with the rise of China, how likely is this to come to pass? Or will the Ukraine crisis refocus minds in Washington on the challenges emanating from Russia? 

— Ben Judah

Washington: No going back to the way things were

Dear Ben,

It’s disorienting to be in Washington right now. On the one hand, there is an overwhelming sense of familiarity as the United States mobilizes all the formidable tools at its disposal to confront a serious security crisis on the Old Continent. On the other hand, it’s impossible to shake the feeling that this familiarity is an illusion—that, as you write, the ground has shifted fundamentally under our feet, and that there is no going back to the way things were. I know our Baltic friends may not like to hear this, but no matter what happens in Ukraine, I think the emerging order will need to rely on Europeans taking much more responsibility for their own security.

In February of last year, US President Joe Biden told the world that “America is back. Diplomacy is back at the center of our foreign policy.” For a certain kind of Europeanist in DC, Biden’s promise is finally being made good. The withdrawal of Afghanistan may have been badly bungled—damaging both the United States’ reputation for competence and its standing as a values-first leader of the West—while loud attempts to “pivot to Asia,” appearing to come at the expense of European allies (see: the mismanaged AUKUS rollout), may have been unfortunate and counterproductive. But the United States is, indeed, finding its footing again. 

Though there was some lag in spooling up a response to this crisis, the United States is now firing on all cylinders. It is engaging with allies to ensure as unified a front as possible against Russian threats, readying what could be a crippling sanctions package against Moscow should Putin choose to attack Ukraine, and sending troops and materiel to jittery frontline NATO states as assurance. At the same time, Washington is endlessly engaging with Moscow, looking for a way to get the Russians to back down. At least superficially, it feels like the liberal world order of yesterday is being rebuilt.

But look a little closer, and you see how badly the status quo ante is out of reach. Whether Ukraine gets attacked or not, NATO’s vaunted “open door” has, for all intents and purposes, been definitively shut. The promises made in 2008 to Ukraine and Georgia that they could eventually join NATO (after France and Germany voted against extending a Membership Action Plan to both) are now seen as a strategic mistake. Though Western leaders still insist on upholding the principle that any country can choose which alliances it decides to join, they recognize that in practice that principle is a dead letter. 

Within the Normandy Format, France and Germany are pressuring Ukraine to accept Russian demands in order to avoid a destabilizing war that would not only lead to unspeakable bloodshed on Ukrainian soil, but would profoundly destabilize Europe itself. And given that the visits of both French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to Moscow and Kyiv were closely coordinated with Washington, it appears that Franco-German pressure on Ukraine has the tacit blessing of the White House. The frustrations with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy aired in the press several weeks ago were not tied to any specific statements made by the Ukrainian leader, but likely reflect a deeper displeasure among senior US policymakers that Kyiv takes NATO and EU membership seriously. “Park Russia”—a policy that seeks to find a lasting compromise with Moscow over European security so that the United States can focus on Asia—seems to still have a pull on the strategic imaginations of several senior Biden policy aides. And for Russia to remain “parked,” Kyiv will have to acquiesce to Moscow’s demands.

The policy almost certainly played a role in triggering the current crisis. While the Biden administration had no intention of renegotiating bedrock principles of European security (including NATO’s “open door”), its desire to tie up loose ends in Europe telegraphed to Russia that the United States had one foot out the door. As you note, Putin seems to be pushing his advantage as far as it will go. He correctly understands that the post-Cold War settlement is more fragile than ever. If the United States is pivoting away, why not give the old order a shove and see what happens? If Ukraine is compelled to kneel by its own Western backers in the name of European peace, his gambit will have paid off.

It must be said that the Biden administration’s efforts to unify allies in response to Russia’s build-up have been quite successful—for now at least. While Moscow may collect some wins in Ukraine, it is facing a galvanized Western alliance on its doorstep. Longer term, however, the Kremlin probably feels justified in continuing its aggressive revisionism. It need only to look at American domestic politics to sense that today’s US commitments may not be sustainable tomorrow.

Though many Republicans in Congress may want an even more aggressive and confrontational stance against Russia, it’s clear that these lawmakers do not comfortably speak for many Republican voters that former President Donald Trump brought into the party. Tucker Carlson’s popular Russia-sympathetic diatribes on Fox News suggest that any Republican seeking national office will find it difficult to openly voice support for the kind of stances being pushed behind closed doors in Congress. Among Republican policy elites, the emerging “hawk” consensus, articulated most clearly by thinkers such as Elbridge Colby (who served in the Trump administration), is that the United States will need to prioritize Asia at the expense of Europe, and that Europeans will need to sort out security matters with Russia as best they can on their own. From influential perches at the Wall Street Journal, traditional maximalists like John Bolton still argue that the United States will need to ramp up its defense spending in order to handle both theaters at once. But they likely represent a dying breed among Republicans.

Meanwhile, Biden’s forceful use of the bully pulpit may have quieted dissent in his own ranks for the time being. But the constituency for a muscular, militarized, globe-spanning American foreign policy is waning among Democrats, too. The Bernie Sanders constituency is playing ball with the administration for the time being, but is doubtless biding its time. It will not sit quietly aside if Biden chooses not to run again in 2024.

In other words, the potential lines being drawn across the Old Continent may not be as stable as they seem. A distracted United States has, for the time being, turned its attention to Europe once again, and its overwhelming power may stabilize the situation temporarily (albeit with Ukraine’s Western aspirations a casualty—no small thing). But the temptation to pivot away from Europe is likely to continue playing a major role in shaping American foreign policy going forward. A lasting European security order will almost certainly not be based on American power guaranteeing it.

— Damir Marusic

The post Transatlantic Telegram: Whatever happens next in Ukraine, a new European security order is emerging appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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